Variations of the word “confidence” appeared in the Bush’s State of the Union six times. At times, one could not help envisioning Bush prancing down an Austrian path singing “I Have Confidence” on his way to the von Trapp family home. And like Fräulein Maria as she approached the gate, Bush demonstrated anything but confidence in his State of the Union address by admitting defeat, failing to make bold proposals, and…by backing away from the word “reprocessing.”

A leak prior to the State of the Union indicated that Bush would announce an initiative to explore advanced nuclear fuel cycles (i.e. reprocessing) to complement an energy policy featuring “nucular” energy. Such an announcement would have directly reversed a thirty-year old policy instituted by Ford and Carter proscribing reprocessing in the U.S. (Though this ban had lapsed, a new policy has not been formulated to fill the vacuum.) This proposal undoubtedly fell by the wayside in Bush’s search for bold new policies. A Washington Post op-ed by John Deutch and Ernest Moniz advocating a take-it-slow approach almost certainly influenced Bush’s decision.

Proliferation concerns were the primary driver for a ban on reprocessing in the United States. Reprocessing technologies capable of separating plutonium from irradiated fuel are particularly troubling due to the possibility of diversion by operators or theft by terrorists. The Japanese have separated tons of plutonium from their commercial reactor program. However, plutonium from a normally operated commercial reactor is not particularly attractive for a weapon given its high heat and neutron generation rates. Though this material is usable in a weapon, the design of the weapon requires greater sophistication. Nevertheless, securing and eliminating these stockpiles is essential for preventing theft and diversion of weapons-usable material.

Alternative reprocessing technologies can be designed to commingle plutonium with other elements. Theft and diversion are less likely since the plutonium-bearing material is more radioactive and requires additional processes to extract plutonium. While these technologies raise barriers to proliferation in comparison to plutonium extraction, no fuel cycle is “proliferation proof” – some fuel cycles are more resistant to proliferation than others.

And despite an abundance of wishful thinking, renouncing nuclear energy will not eliminate proliferation risks. While eliminating these facilities limits access to sensitive nuclear technologies, the nuclear genie is out of the bottle. Developing a nuclear weapon is only a question of time, resources, and determination.

The challenge then for nuclear scientists and engineers in developing proliferation resistant nuclear energy systems is to ensure that misusing the facility is less attractive than pursuing a dedicated clandestine weapons program. These systems must also be designed such that they can be effectively safeguarded against theft and diversion, requiring proliferators to abrogate from treaty commitments - sending a clear signal of intent and allowing the international community to react. Minimizing the use of sensitive processes (e.g. Pu separation, enrichment, etc.) further improves proliferation resistance by limiting access to these technologies.

However, technical solutions are not enough. A combination of technical and institutional measures (e.g. safeguards, fuel supply guarantees, spent fuel return, etc.) will maximize the benefits derived from fission while generating confidence that nuclear technologies are not misused.